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Chapter 19
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9 January 2009
19.1 Orthodoxy and a Recent Challenge
Whether Einstein’s theory of general relativity (GR) satisfies a substantive principle
deserving the name “general covariance” is a notoriously controversial matter. John
Norton’s masterful review of the matter, published in 1993, was aptly subtitled “eight
decades of dispute” (Norton, 1993). And yet, despite the continuing controversy, there
has been broad agreement about a number of core issues. Two closely related theses are
part of the orthodox position: (i) that general covariance does not distinguish general
relativity from pre-relativistic theories when the latter are appropriately formulated
and (ii) that general covariance, by itself, does not have any physical content.
The first of these theses is almost as old as GR itself. Einstein had sought a
gravitational theory that was compatible with special relativity (SR). Soon after 1905
he came to believe that what was required was a generalization of SR’s restricted
relativity principle. According to SR, all inertial frames are on a par from the point
of view of the fundamental laws. What Einstein sought was a theory according
to which all frames are on a par. General covariance was supposed to implement
this. A theory is general covariant if the equations that express its laws are left
form-invariant by smooth but otherwise arbitrary coordinate transformations.1 Since
these coordinate transformations include transformations between coordinate systems
adapted to frames in arbitrary relative motion, it would seem that there can be no
privileged frames of reference in a general covariant theory.
This impression, however, is misleading. As Kretschmann famously pointed out,
“by means of a purely mathematical reformulation of the equations representing the
theory, and
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1As discussed below, this is but one of a number of closely related properties that go by the name
“general covariance”.
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with, at most, mathematical complications connected with that reformulation” any
physical theory can by made generally covariant, and this “without modifying any of
its content that can be tested by observation” (Kretschmann, 1917, 575–6).2 Generally
covariant formulations of pre-relativistic theories (i.e., Newtonian and specially rela-
tivistic theories) are now utterly familiar in philosophical and foundational discussion.
Even if it can be argued that, so formulated, the physical content of such a theory is
somehow different from that of the “standard”, non-covariant formulation (a claim
I reject), it seems that general covariance cannot be what distinguishes GR from
generally covariant versions of pre-relativistic theories.
The idea that general covariance per se has no physical content is reinforced
when one considers the nature of the controversy dissected in Norton’s review. In
the conclusion to his paper, Norton claims that there are essentially three views on
the question whether a ‘principle of general covariance’ plays a foundational role in
GR (852–3). The third of these views straightforwardly rejects the idea that general
covariance has any foundational role at all. The first view seeks to supplement general
covariance with some other requirement. For example, GR might be distinguished
from a rival theory T either because T ’s simplest formulation is not its generally
covariant formulation, or because, when the generally covariant formulation of T
is compared to (generally covariant) GR, it is seen that GR is the simpler, more
elegant theory. Such an approach to identifying the ‘principles’ that distinguish GR
faces a host of problems. But what is important for the current discussion is that,
according to the approach, a theory’s being generally covariant has nothing to do with
its special status. Instead the generally covariant formulations of two theories to be
compared merely make manifest the truly distinguishing characteristic, viz., some
kind of simplicity.
The second point of view Norton mentions is associated with the so-called
Anderson–Friedman programme (Anderson, 1967, 73–88; Friedman, 1983, 46–61).
Here one distinguishes between two types of geometric object that can feature in the
formulation of a spacetime theory. There are the truly dynamical objects on the one
hand and, on the other, the absolute objects: very roughly, objects that do not vary
from model to model of the theory. The programme also distinguishes between the
covariance group of the theory (the group of transformations, defined on the theory’s
space of kinematically possible models, that leaves the space of dynamically possible
models invariant) and the theory’s invariance group. The latter is that subgroup of
the covariance group that includes all and only automorphisms of the theory’s abso-
lute objects. One can then differentiate GR from pre-relativistic theories by noting
that only GR satisfies a principle of general invariance: the invariance group of the
theory should include the group of all smooth, but otherwise arbitrary coordinate
transformations. For a specially relativistic theory, for example, the invariance group
will be the Poincaré group, no matter whether the standard formulation of the theory
is considered (in which case the covariance group will also be the Poincaré group) or
whether a generally covariant formulation is considered.
2I gloss over the fact that the claim that “all physical observations consist in the determination of
purely topological relations” formed part of Kretschmann’s argument. See Norton (1993, 818), from
where the translation is taken.
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Anderson’s definitions validate a sense in which the group of general coordinate
transformations (or the diffeomorphism group) is a ‘symmetry’ group of GR but not
of, say, SR (however the latter is formulated). In a generally covariant formulation of
a specially relativistic theory, the transformations of a proper subgroup of the diffeo-
morphism group isomorphic to the Poincaré group have a special status: they leave
the theory’s absolute objects invariant. In GR, every diffeomorphism has this special
status and so (it seems) diffeomorphisms in GR differ in status to diffeomorphisms in
SR.
On closer inspection, things are not so clear-cut. A group gets to be a symmetry
group on Anderson’s view if it leaves the theory’s absolute objects invariant. Arbitrary
diffeomorphisms preserve the absolute objects of GR, and are thus symmetries, only
because GR has no absolute objects and thus, trivially, any transformation preserves
GR’s absolute objects. It therefore seems that what really differentiates GR from
pre-relativistic theories is its lack of absolute objects.3 In particular, nothing in
Anderson’s approach suggests we should treat two diffeomorphically-related models
of GR differently from how we might treat two diffeomorphically-related models of a
generally covariant SR theory.
Thus, on any of the three views that Norton highlights, GR’s general covariance has
little to do with what distinguishes GR from pre-relativistic theories. Pre-relativistic
theories can be given generally covariant formulations and the substantive principles
just reviewed have little to do with general covariance per se. They might highlight
various special features of GR. They might even highlight differences between the
status of diffeomorphisms in GR and in SR. But they do not licence the claim that
GR’s general covariance is somehow more substantive than that of SR. All this, I
claim, is orthodoxy. It has recently been challenged.
Amongst philosophers of physics, the challenge has been spearheaded by John
Earman (2006a; 2006b). He claims to be following physicists in distinguishing two
kinds of general covariance: merely formal general covariance and substantive general
covariance. Generally covariant formulations of pre-relativistic theories are supposed
to satisfy only the former of the two. Note that Earman’s substantive general covariance
is quite distinct from Anderson’s ‘principle of general invariance’ or any other of
the notions just reviewed. It will clarify matters to introduce Earman’s definition
as just one of a number of versions of general covariance. It will also be helpful to
introduce a number of ‘toy’ theories, whose satisfaction of the various versions of
general covariance can then be assessed.
3I should note that whether GR does indeed lack absolute objects in the Anderson–Friedman sense
is currently a live topic. In fact, it seems thatp g counts as an absolute object (Pitts, 2006; Giulini,
2007; Sus, 2008, Ch. 3).
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Our toy theories are all theories of the Klein–Gordon field. Their sole matter field
will be a single, real scalar field. They differ, inter alia, in the geometric structure
they posit.
The first theory is a specially relativistic theory written in standard form. It is












 m2ˆ D 0 (SR1)
This equation is only satisfied by descriptions of ˆ given with respect to inertial
coordinate systems. I.e., if ˆ.x/ is a coordinate representation of our scalar field
that satisfies equation SR1, then (in general) of those coordinate redescriptions ob-
tained from ˆ.x/ via coordinate transformations, only those obtained via Poincaré
transformations will also satisfy SR1.
Contrast this theory with generally relativistic Klein–Gordon theory, defined via
the following equations:
gˆI  m2ˆ D 0
G.g/ D T.ˆ; g/:
(GR1)
Here the equations are intended to be read as identifying the values of the coordinate
components of the objects involved. If all the components of the pair .gab; ˆ/ with
respect to some coordinate chart fxg satisfy these equations, then their components
with respect to any chart smoothly related to fxg will also do so in the region where
the charts overlap. The theory might equally be specified via a set of equations relating
the geometric objects themselves, rather than their coordinate components:
gabrarbˆ  m2ˆ D 0
Gab.g/ D Tab.ˆ; g/
(GR2)
Now for the first two formulations of general covariance. A theory T is generally
covariant iff:
GC1 the equations of motion/field equations of T transform in a generally covariant
manner under an arbitrary coordinate transformation, or
GC2 the equations of motion/field equations of T relate “intrinsic, coordinate-free”4
objects; they are true independently of coordinate systems.
GR1 and GR2, our two formulations of generally relativistic Klein–Gordon theory,
satisfy GC1 and GC2 respectively. Our specially relativistic theory satisfies neither.
But this is easily corrected via a Kretschmann-type move. We simply rewrite
4The terminology is Earman’s (2006a, 446).
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equation SR1 so that it holds good in arbitrary coordinates, making the role of the
fixed metric of Minkowski spacetime explicit:
ˆI  m2ˆ D 0: (SR2)
Alternatively, rather than equating coordinate components, we can write down an
equation referring directly to the geometric object fields themselves:
abrarbˆ  m2ˆ D 0: (SR3)
It is clear that, appropriately formulated, our specially relativistic theory now satisfies
GC1 and GC2.
So far we have focused on the transformation properties of a theory’s equations.
Let’s consider models of the theories. Models of GR2 are triples of the form .M; g;ˆ/,
whereM is some 4-dimensional differentiable manifold, g is a Lorentzian metric on
M and ˆ is a scalar field onM . g and ˆ must satisfy the equations GR2. Models
of SR3 are likewise triples of the form .M; ;ˆ/, whereM is some 4-dimensional
differentiable manifold,  is now a flat, Minkowski metric onM and ˆ is a scalar
field onM .  and ˆ must satisfy the equation SR3.
Our third formulation of general covariance is stated in terms of models. A theory
T , with models of the form .M;O1; O2; : : : ; ON / is generally covariant iff
GC3 if .M;O1; O2; : : : ; ON / is amodel ofT , then so is .M; dO1; dO2; : : : ; dON /
for any diffeomorphism d 2 Diff.M/.5
It is uncontroversial that generally relativistic theories, and hence our theory GR2,
satisfy GC3.6 What of our reformulations of SR1?
The orthodox (philosopher’s) answer is that the theory specified via SR3 satisfies
GC3 just as much as any generally relativistic theory. For suppose that .M; ;ˆ/
satisfies SR3. It follows from the fact that this is a tensor equation that .M; d; dˆ/
also satisfies SR3. I.e., if abrarbˆ m2ˆ D 0 then dabr 0ar 0bdˆ m2dˆ D
0, where r 0 is the covariant derivative associated with d. In their agenda-setting
paper on the hole argument, Earman and Norton embraced this equivalence with
respect to GC3 of appropriately formulated pre-relativistic theories and generally
relativistic theories, arguing that the substantivalist was compelled to classify all
“local spacetime theories” as indeterministic (Earman and Norton, 1987, 524).
5This matches the definition given by Earman (1989, 47). Diff.M/ is the group ofM ’s automor-
phisms; i.e., the group of all invertible maps fromM onto itself that preserve its differentiable structure.
GC3 is the requirement that Diff.M/ be a subgroup of T ’s covariance group in Anderson’s sense.
6Uncontroversial, that is, amongst those who classify GR as a generally covariant theory.
Maudlin’s metrical essentialist (Maudlin, 1988, 1990) denies that both .M;O1; O2; : : : ; ON / and
.M; dO1; dO2; : : : ; dON / represent genuine possibilities. But even the metrical essentialist can
admit that .M;O1; O2; : : : ; ON / and .M; dO1; dO2; : : : ; dON / are on a par as models of T .
They should claim only that, relative to the choice of .M;O1; O2; : : : ; ON / as the representation of a
genuine possibility, .M; dO1; dO2; : : : ; dON / does not represent a possibility (compare Bartels,
1996).
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Let us return to our general relativistic theory, GR2. A key premise in Earman and
Norton’s argument is their claim that the substantivalist must interpret .M; g;ˆ/
and .M; dg; dˆ/ as representations of distinct possibilities. Most commentators
(relationalists and substantivalists alike) take the moral of the hole argument to be
that .M; g;ˆ/ and .M; dg; dˆ/ should be interpreted as representing the same
physical state of affairs. This gives us our fourth version of general covariance,
Earman’s “substantive general covariance” (2006a, 447; 2006b, 4-5).
GC4 A theory T is generally covariant iff:
1. if .M;O1; : : : ; ON / is a model of T , then so is .M; dO1; : : : ; dON /
for any d 2 Diff.M/ and
2. .M;O1; : : : ; ON / and .M; dO1; : : : ; dON / represent the same physi-
cal possibility.
In other words GC4 supplements GC3 with the requirement that Diff.M/ is a gauge
group in the non-technical sense: diffeomorphisms relate distinct representations of
one and the same situation.
Does the specially relativistic theory expressed by SR3 satisfy GC4? Not accord-
ing to Earman. GC4 counts as “substantive” because:
it is not automatically satisfied by a theory that is formally generally
covariant, i.e. a theory whose equations of motion/field equations are
written in generally covariant coordinate notation or, even better, in
coordinate-free notation. (Earman, 2006a, 444)
Thus, for Earman, the substantive principle embodied in GC4 differentiates GR from
pre-relativistic theories, even when these are formulated using generally covariant
notation, along the lines of SR3. He is committed to denying that Diff.M/ is a gauge
group with respect to the theory expressed by SR3. What justification does he offer?
19.4 When (not) to See Gauge Freedom
According to Earman, the physics literature contains a “generally accepted apparatus
that applies to a very broad range of spacetime theories and that serves to identify
the gauge freedom of any theory in the class.” This apparatus decrees that GR
does satisfy GC4 whereas “formally generally covariant forms of special relativistic
theories. . . need not satisfy substantive general covariance” (Earman, 2006a, 445).
The “broad range” of spacetime theories Earman refers to are those whose field
equations are derivable from an action principle. Suppose T ’s r equations of motion
are derivable from an action S D R dpxL.x;u;u.n//. x D .x1; : : : xp/ are the inde-
pendent variables (the spacetime coordinates x; y; z; t in the cases we’re considering)
and u D .u1; : : : ur/ are the dependent variables (e.g., g and ˆ). The term u.n/
indicates that L can depend on the derivatives of u (with respect to
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the independent variables) up to some finite order n. A group G of transformations
g W .x;u/ 7! .x0;u0/ whose generators leave L form-invariant up to a divergence term
is a variational symmetry group of S (Earman, 2006a, 449–50).
Associated with this notion of a symmetry of S are the (generalized) Noether
theorems. The one relevant to Earman’s proposal is Noether’s second theorem: if the
parameters of G are s arbitrary functions of the independent variables, then there are
s independent equations relating the r Euler expressions, the r variational derivatives
ıL=ıui of the Lagrangian with respect to each dependent variable. Imposing Hamil-
ton’s principle with respect to that variable (i.e., requiring that S is stationary with
respect to arbitrary infinitesimal variations of that dependent variable that vanish on
the boundary of integration) gives the Euler–Lagrange equation ıL=ıui D 0. Thus
Noether’s second theorem shows that the equations of motion are not independent
and we have fewer independent equations of motion than field variables. When time
is amongst the independent variables, this underdetermination manifests itself as
apparent indeterminism. The physicist’s standard move is to restore determinism
by identifying solutions related by the variational symmetries. Thus Earman writes
that “the applicability of Noether’s second theorem is taken to signal the presence of
gauge freedom” (Earman, 2006b, 7) and proposes that, according to the physicists’
apparatus, “variational symmetries containing arbitrary functions of the independent
variables connect equivalent descriptions of the same physical situation, i.e., are gauge
transformations.” (Earman, 2006a, 450).
Applied to our generally relativistic Klein–Gordon theory this gives us the ex-
pected result. What seems to me more suspect is Earman’s application of the ma-
chinery to our specially relativistic Klein–Gordon theory. He notes that our formally






whereˆ but not  is subject to Hamilton’s principle. Earman concludes that while “the
action admits the Poincaré group as a variational symmetries. . . the apparatus sketched
above renders the verdict that there is no non-trivial gauge freedom in the offing”
(Earman, 2006a, 452). In other words, Earman suggests that applying his apparatus
to this theory yields the verdict that diffeomorphisms are not gauge transformations.
There are at least three reasons to be sceptical of the method used to reach this
conclusion.
1. The criterion Earman claims to find in the physics literature tells us that if some
group G is a variational symmetry to which Noether’s 2nd theorem applies, then
G is a gauge group. I.e., it tells us when to see gauge freedom. But to draw the
conclusion he does concerning SR3, Earman needs the converse criterion: G is
a gauge group only if G is a variational symmetry. I.e., he needs a criterion that
tells us when not to see gauge freedom. Earman freely admits that the apparatus
is silent on non-Lagrangian theories (e.g., Earman, 2006a, 454) which, we shall
see, is significant.
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2. Physicists’ identification of (local) variational symmetries as gauge symmetries
is not simply read off from the Lagrangian formalism. As Earman himself
carefully explains, the identification is motivated by a desire to avoid indeter-
minism. But then there are equally good grounds for regarding a theory for
which Diff.M/ is a symmetry group in the sense of GC3, but which is not
derivable from an action principle for which Diff.M/ is a variational symmetry
group, as also satisfying GC4. I.e., there are equally good grounds for regarding
Diff.M/ as a gauge group with respect to such a theory too. The reason there
is not a good precedent in the physics literature for such a move is indicative of
the fact that such theories are almost never discussed (in this literature); it does
not indicate that in such theories diffeomorphisms should not be regarded as
gauge.
3. Finally, what of Earman’s claim that the Poincaré group is a variational sym-
metry of 1? Although he does not explicitly say that Diff.M/ fails to be a
variational symmetry group, this would appear to be implicit in his discussion.
But why should one think this? It is true that one only applies Hamilton’s
principle to ˆ, in order to derive the equation SR3. One does not also con-
sider variations in . But this is irrelevant to which transformations count as
variational symmetries in sense of Noether’s second theorem. That theorem
applies in full force to 1, independently of which of the dependent variables
one regards as background structure and which one regards as dynamical. One
still obtains mathematical identities relating the Euler expressions. The only
difference with the general relativistic case, where all dependent variables are
subject to Hamilton’s principle, is that the vanishing of the Euler expression
corresponding to  (effectively the stress energy tensor of the Klein–Gordon
field) is not one of the field equations.7
It is true that, if we consider drag-alongs only of ˆ under the action of diffeo-
morphisms, while leaving  unaltered, then only a subgroup of diffeomorphisms
isomorphic to the Poincaré group will be symmetries. Why should we consider such
transformations? In the next section we will see that there is a reason, and that it
connects to whether we regard our specially relativistic theory as derived from an
action principle.
19.5 An Alternative Distinction Between Theories
The distinctions between formulations of a theory that we have so far considered have
focused on the equations that express the theory, even though our characterization of
general covariance has taken a model-theoretic turn. Continuing to think in terms of
models is key to making some further, crucial distinctions.
7For an illuminating discussion of various connections between Noether’s theorems and general
covariance, see Brown and Brading (2002).
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Let us suppose that the models of our theories have the following basic structure.8
They are functions from a given space, V , into a given space of field values, W . The
theories will involve a space,K, of kinematically possible models (i.e., the space of all
suitably well-behaved but otherwise arbitrary such functions), and a proper subspace
S  K of dynamically possible models, normally picked out via a set of equations.
In these terms, a “theory” corresponding to equations GR2 will involve a differ-
entiable manifold M as the space V . A kinematically possible model will assign
a (pseudo)metric tensor and real number to each point of M in a suitably smooth
way, and consistently with any necessary boundary conditions. The subspace S of
dynamically possible models is picked out by the equations GR2. Call this theory
TGR.
When it comes to the specially relativistic theory, however, we have a choice as to
how to proceed. In the first version of such a theory, V is taken to beM equipped
with a particular Minkowski metric. Each model of the theory then simply maps each
point of this space into the real numbers. K0 is the space of all suitably well-behaved
such functions. The subspace of physically possibly models, S 0, is picked out by a
suitable equation, constraining how ˆ is adapted to the fixed metric structure of V .
Call this theory TSR1.
In the second version of the specially relativistic theory, V is taken, as in TGR,
simply to be the differentiable manifold M . We may suppose that the space of
kinematically possible models is also the same as that of TGR: each point ofM is to
be mapped to a metric tensor and real number in a manner consistent with boundary
conditions and smoothness requirements. The theory will differ from TGR in terms of
its subspace, S 00, of dynamically possible models. This will be picked out (obviously)
by a different set of equations to those that pick out S . In addition to the Klein–Gordon
equation, there will be an equation requiring the vanishing of the Riemann curvature
tensor: Rabcd D 0. Call this theory TSR2.
Which of the equations SR1, SR2 or SR3 is suitable to TSR1 and TSR2? It is
clear that any one of these equations can be understood as picking out the space S 0
of TSR1. Provided coordinate charts on V that are adapted to its metric structure are
chosen, SR1 will be satisfied by all and only those models in S 0. If we allow arbitrary
coordinates, and interpret  as the coordinate components of the metric structure
of V , then SR2 will be satisfied by all and only those models in S 0. If we interpret
ab as referring directly to the fixed metric structure of V , then SR3 is satisfied by all
and only those models in S 0.
This is not quite true for TSR2. SR2 or SR3 are the natural equations to combine
with the vanishing of the Riemann tensor. Although, for every model in S 00, there is a
coordinate chart such that SR1 holds, for two arbitrary models in S 00 different coordi-
natizations will be needed. Nonetheless, I think it is clear that the different covariance
properties of SR1, SR2 or SR3 do not track in any perspicuous way the difference
between TSR1 and TSR2. To repeat, all three equations are equally legitimate ways of
specifying TSR1. The difference between the theories (or formulations of the theory)
can be made out in terms of equations (TSR2, but not
8The following is, very loosely, based on the much more sophisticated material in Belot (2007, §4).
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TSR1, involves an equation constraining the geometry), but this does not seem like
the most perspicuous way to do so.
19.6 In Search of Substantive General Covariance Again
It is time to assess the general covariance of our new formulations of special and
generally relativistic Klein–Gordon theory. Before doing so, I introduce yet another
notion of (substantive?) general covariance, advocated by Carlo Rovelli. According
to Rovelli:
A field theory is formulated in manner invariant under passive diffs (or
change of co-ordinates), if we can change the co-ordinates of the manifold,
re-express all the geometric quantities (dynamical and non-dynamical)
in the new coordinates, and the form of the equations of motion does
not change. A theory is invariant under active diffs, when a smooth
displacement of the dynamical fields (the dynamical fields alone) over
the manifold, sends solutions of the equations of motion into solutions
of the equations of motion. (Rovelli, 2001, 122, original emphasis)
Rovelli’s terminology of “active” versus “passive” diffeomorphisms (as opposed
to coordinate transformations) is somewhat novel. Let me make a few, hopefully
clarifying, remarks. One should not think of diffeomorphisms (as is sometimes
unfortunately suggested) as “moving points around”. The map d WM !M simply
associates each point ofM in its domain with another. This map induces maps on
fields defined onM , e.g., d W g 7! dg. One can think, perhaps, of these maps as
‘moving g around’ (although even this is a bit picturesque; really we use the map to
define a new field in terms of an old one). One set of fields onM are the coordinate
charts. This suggests the following way of distinguishing ‘active’ from ‘passive’
diffeomorphisms:
1. When d is thought of as inducing a change of coordinate chart, but the physical
fields are left unchanged, d is a ‘passive diffeomorphism’.
2. When d is thought of as inducing changes to all the physical fields, d is an
‘active diffeomorphism’.9
With the notions of active and passive diffeomorphisms so defined, a theory T satisfies
GC1 and GC2 if it is invariant under passive diffeomorphisms. It satisfies GC3 if it is
invariant under active diffeomorphisms. But the requirement Rovelli in fact labels
“active diffeomorphism invariance” in the quotation above is stronger than this. It relies
crucially on a distinction between a theory’s dynamical and non-dynamical fields.
Let models of T be of the form .M;Ai ;Di /, where the Ai are the non-dynamical
fields and the Di are the dynamical fields. A theory T is then generally covariant
according Rovelli’s version of substantive general covariance iff:
9I believe this fits with a more recent characterisation that Rovelli has given (2004, 62–5).
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GC5 If .M;A1; : : : ;D1; : : :/ is a model of T , then so is .M;A1; : : : ; dD1; : : :/ for
any d 2 Diff.M/.10
How do our theories measure up against this (and the previous) notions of general
covariance? Consider first TSR1, whose space of kinematically possible models K0
was constituted by maps from a manifold equipped with metric structure to the the
reals. We have already seen that its defining equation can be so formulated that it
satisfies both GC1 and GC2. Suppose .M; g;ˆ/ is a dynamically possible model,
i.e., .M; g;ˆ/ 2 S 0. In general, .M; dg; dˆ/ will not be kinematically possible,
let alone dynamically possible. Hence this theory does not satisfy GC3 (and thus
also fails to satisfy GC4). If we consider just dragging-along the sole dynamical field,
ˆ, we obtain a model .M; g; dˆ/ that is in K0. (So restricted, Diff.M/ does have
a well defined action on K0.) However, .M; g; dˆ/ … S 0, hence TSR1 also fails to
satisfy GC5.
Consider next TGR and suppose that .M; g;ˆ/ 2 S . .M; dg; dˆ/ 2 S and
hence TGR satisfies GC3. (Note that GC3 is just the requirement that the action of
Diff.M/ on the space of kinematically possible models fixes the solution subspace.)
The hole argument, therefore, suggests that it should also be classified as satisfying
GC4. Finally, what of Rovelli’s GC5? Since there are no non-dynamical fields, the
requirement is again that .M; dg; dˆ/ 2 S and GC5 is satisfied.
Finally, we consider TSR2 and suppose that .M; g;ˆ/ is an arbitrary model in
S 00. Since .M; dg; dˆ/ 2 S 00 for arbitrary d it follows that TSR2, unlike TSR1,
satisfies GC3, and (pace Earman) GC4 (recall the hole argument). Does it satisfy
GC5?
That depends on whether g counts as a dynamical field. The passage quoted from
Rovelli above continues:
Distinguishing a truly dynamical field, namely a field with independent
degrees of freedom, from a nondynamical field disguised as dynamical
(such as a metric field g with the equations of motion RiemannŒg D 0)
might require a detailed analysis (of, for instance, the Hamiltonian) of
the theory. (Rovelli, 2001, 122)
It is certainly the case that the Anderson–Friedman notion of an absolute object can
be invoked to classify g as a non-dynamical field. TSR2 then fails to be generally
covariant in the sense of GC5 (cf. Giulini, 2007). But how much illumination does
this piece of classification achieve? In some intuitive sense, the metric structure of
a specially relativistic theory plays the role of a fixed background against which the
real dynamics is defined and unfolds. There is no such background in GR. Not only
is the metric a genuine dynamical player; its dynamical evolution is affected by the
material content of spacetime.11 The action–reaction principle is satisfied. I doubt
that the right way to make these ideas more precise is to discover a criterion that, e.g.,
TGR meets but TSR2 fails to meet.
10Compare Earman’s definition of a dynamical symmetry (Earman, 1989, 45).
11The former need not entail the latter. For example, consider the, admittedly somewhat contrived,
theory whose field equations are gabrarbˆ  m2ˆ D 0 and Rab.g/ D 0. The metric in this theory
has a non-trivial dynamics and constrains, but is unaffected by, the evolution of ˆ.
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Recall Earman’s claim that, if we restrict attention to the class of Lagrangian field
theories, generally relativistic theories, but not specially relativistic theories, satisfy
GC4. In light of the previous section we can partially endorse this claim, for of the two
specially relativistic theories, only TSR1 is a Lagrangian theory. All of its equations
can be derived from the action described in section 19.4. TSR2, on the other hand,
does not appear to be a Lagrangian theory.12 The obvious ways to derive Rabcd D 0
as an Euler-Lagrange equation (in addition to the Klein–Gordon equation) requires
an additional field and thus alters the space of kinematically possible models (Sorkin,
2002; Earman, 2006a, 455–6). However, it should be stressed that that the reason
diffeomorphisms do not count as gauge symmetries of the relevant formulation of
the specially relativistic theory is because they are not symmetries; the theory does
not satisfy GC3. And when we do consider a formulation of the specially relativistic
theory for which diffeomorphisms are symmetries, viz. TSR2, Earman’s Lagrangian
apparatus is simply silent. The points of comparison between TSR2 and TGR strongly
suggest that—re ontology, the nature of what is observable and the gauge status of
diffeomorphisms—what goes for one should go for the other.
There are (at least) two ways of conceiving of pre-relativistic theories: as theories
that fail both GC3 and GC5 (such as TSR1) and as theories satisfying both GC3
and GC4 (such as TSR2). Generally relativistic theories appear distinguished in that
only the second kind of conception is available. If the second kind of conception
of pre-relativistic theories is adopted, and they are then compared to GR, it seems
doubtful that the interesting differences between GR and such theories is to be made
out in terms of a variety of general covariance, or a difference in the status of the
diffeomorphism group.
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